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NOTES
WHO MAY SECURE A COPYRIGHT*
PERSONS ENTITLED TO COPYRIGHT

Sections nine and ten of the copyright act provide, "that any person entitled thereto by this act may secure copyright for their work
by publication thereof with the notice of copyright required by this
act." Congress leaves it up to the author, proprietor, or assignee to
secure the copyright; the word "may" implies that the provision is
not compulsory but rather permissive and yet is translated into a
must if the copyright is desired. Unfortunately there is no provision for examination of origin as in the case of patents, and for
that reason the act provides that the protection be extended to all
the copyrightable, component parts of the word copyright.
In section three,, the inference is that the Act does not purport to
be a part of the settled law before the present statute.'
For the purpose of continuity, this paper will be divided into
several sections for simplification and easier analysis. Each class
or group is subject to interpretation in applying the applicable
principles of copyright law, and for a correct determination, each
prcblem must be read in light of the Federal Copyright Act.
GENERALLY

The Federal Copyright Act provides that the author or proprietor of any work, made the subject of copyright, or his executor,
administrators, or assignee shall be entitled to a copyright in such
work. The Act further provides that no copyright shall subsist in
the original text of any work which is in the public domain or any
work which was published in the country or any foreign country
prior to July 1, 1909, and has not been previously copyrighted in
the United States Government or any reprint, in whole or in part,
thereof: PROVIDED, that copyright may be secured by the post
master general on behalf of the United States in the whole or any
part of the publication authorized by section one of the act of
January 27, 1938. 3 The publication or republication by the government, either separately or in a public document, or any material of
which copyright is subsisting shall not be taken to cause any
abridgement or annulment of the copyright or to authorize any act
*
1.
2.

Submitted in the Nathan Burkan Memorial Competition.
Eggar v. Sunsales Corp., 263 Fed. 373 (2nd Cir. 1920).
17 U.S.C. § 8.

3.

39 U.S.C. § 371.
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of appropriation of such copyright material without the consent of
the copyright proprietor. On these points the act is specific. It provides that the author or proprietor " . . . or his executor and administrator or assignee shall have a copyright for such work ... -4
and an ostensible copyright by one without the statutory description
is wholly void." Thus, one who, without express or implied authority
frcm the author, goes through the forms of copyrighting another's
composition attains no copyright. ' However, if a copyright is
secured in the name of someone other than the composer and no
7
one is thereby prejudiced the copyright is valid.
Copyrights secured under the act of 1909 are computed in the
case of a work published in the first instance from the date of
publication, With a renewal period of the same duration. Of course,
the rights under a renewal term necessarily depends on the validity
of the previous copyright.8 Thus only those persons on whom the
statute confers the right to renewal are entitled to or can obtain
it.' A corporation may be a proprietor, and through the joint action
of its employees, it may become an author and thereby obtain a
copyright.' The particular designations in the statute are exclusive
and any person not falling within the classification of the class
mentioned can not record.1 (Thus while an executor is mentioned
as entitled to a renewal, an administrator is not.") If there is no
executor, surviving spouse or children when the time for renewal
arrives, the next of kin may renew even though the estate has been
administered and the executor is discharged before the expiration
of the copyright. ' " Also there is no vested right to renewal prior to
the time when the right to it accrues under the statute.' 4 This
principle was recently upheld where the co-composer of a song,
during the original copyright term, assigned his copyright renewal
4. 39 U.S.C. § 371.
5. Cohan v. Richmond, 294 Fed. 430 (8th Cir. 1923); April Production Inc. v.
Schirmer, 308 N.Y. 366, 126 N.E.2d 283 (1955).
6. Societe Des Films Menchen v. Vitagraph Co. of America, 251 Fed. 258 (2nd Cir.
1918).
7. Powell v. Stransky, 98 F.Supp. 434 (1918).
8. See Edward Marks Music Corp. v. Continental Record Co., 222 F.2d 488, cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 861 (1955).
The first application for a copyright is good for 28 years
with a renewal term of the same duration.
9. Shapiro Bernstein and Co. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 161 F.2d 406, cert. denied,
331 U.S. 820 (1947).
10. Dan Kasoff Inc. v. Palmer Jewelry Mfg. Co., 171 F.Supp. 603 (1959).
11. Fox Film Corp. v. Knowles, 261 U.S. 326 (1923).
The statute intends that an
executor shall have the same right as the testator if no surviving kin can apply for the
copyright.
12. Gibran v. Nat. Comm. of Gibran, 255 F.2d 121, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 828 (1959).
(This, however, apparently does not apply where a will has been left but no executor has
been provided for.)
13. Silverman v. Sunrise Pictures Corp., 290 Fed. 804, cert. denied, 262 U.S. 758

(1924).
14.

See note 13 supra.
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rights to the plaintiff and before the expiration of the original copyright, the co-composer died leaving no widow or child and his will
contained no specific bequest concerning renewal copyright. The
renewal rights accrued to the executor and not to the plaintiff."s
Hence an author dying before the time in which the right of renewal accrues cannot bequeath this right by will."0 This right of
the survivor, upon applying for the renewal, should be checked
carefully with the copyright statute before an application is made,
as the statute is mandatory rather than directory and is strictly
construed.
STATE

As the Federal Copyright Act does not provide expressly for the
copyrighting by the government the question is still subject to some
doubt. There is at least one decision of a state court holding that
the state may lawfully take unto itself the copyright of the reports
of cases determined by its own judiciary.17 This question of whether
a state could take out a copyright and enjoy the benefits thereof
was brought before the United States Supreme Court in Banks v.
Manchester,"' but unfortunately the court found it unnecessary to
decide this issue and the case was disposed of on other grounds.
It is probable that the highest court would hold that a state could
not be considered a citizen of the United States or a resident therein within the terms of the copyright statute, which seems to leave
little room for interpreting the word citizen.
ASSIGNMENT

The copyright act expressly confers upon the author, proprietor
or assigns of any subject matter, the right to obtain the copyright.'"
Any intellectual product may be assigned by the author, inventor,
or designer before the statutory copyright is obtained, in which
case, the copyright, pursuant to the expressed terms of the statute
may be taken out by the assignee.2 0 Also no one is entitled to obtain
a copyright unless he is the author, or is an assignee of the author..2 1
What the author may do himself, he may assign to another, including the right to secure a copyright. The assignee then becomes a
proprietor, 'as this term is equivalent to assign in the same clause
15.

Miller Music Corp. v. Charles N. Daniels, Inc., 362 U.S. 373 (1960).

16. Silverman v. Sunrise Pictures Corp., 290 Fed. 804, cert. denied, 262 U.S.
(1924).
17. Goulds v. Banks, 53 Conn. 415, 2 Atl. 886 (1880).

18.
19.

20.
21.

128 U.S. 244 (1910).
17 U.S.C.A. § 8.
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National Comics Pub. v. Fawcet Publications, 19 F.2d 594 (2nd Cir. 1951).
April Production Inc. v. Schirmer, Inc., 308 N.Y. 366, 126 N.E.2d 283 (1955).
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'
and implies that the right was originally derived from the author.--2
But where the assignee is not a proprietor, but merely a licensee,
the latter may not take out a valid copyright.2'1 This right to obtain
may be transferred by parol.21 It may also be inferred that an
author who places a book in the hands of a publisher intends to
authorize the publisher to obtain a copyright. The inference, then,
is to convey the author's right of copyright; however, it may be
rebutted where it appears that the author subsequently took out a
copyright in his own name.25' Thus an author may assign the writer's
privilege of taking a copyright independently and make a transfer
of the copyrightable thing itself, where the work is sold to one
26
person and the copyright to another or is reserved unto himself.
The ultimate question, where there is no express contract, is
whether the right to obtain the copyright upon work produced is
at the request of another, in which case, the latter is the proper
party to secure a copyright. An express agreement, on the part of
the author, that the employer shall have a copyright of the work
produced entitles the employer to the copyright. The fact that one
is employed to execute literary work does not vest the power in
the employer to copyright the finished product.2 7 Of course, the
intention of the parties, as to which of them shall have the right to
copyright, is decisive.2 8 Nor does the mere fact of employment
make the employer the absolute owner of .his employee's productions. If there is nothing within the terms and conditions under
shall belong
the attending circumstance implying that the copyright
29
to the employer, it may be secured by the author.
LETTERS,

PHOTOGRAPHS AND ARCHITECTURAL

PLANS

Generally it may be said that the writer of a letter has a distinct
property right within the letter superior even to that of the person
to whom the letter is sent,"6 and after the writer's death his representatives are the persons entitled to copyright it. However, the
recipient of a letter may publish it against the will of the letter
22. Harms v. Stern, 229 Fed. 42 (2nd Cir. 1915). The legal title to a copyright
vests in the person in whose name it is taken out and may be held in trust for the true
owner.
23. Morse v. Fields, 127 F. Supp. 63 (1954).
24. Callaghan v. Myers, 128 U.S. 617 (1865).
25. Miffen v. R. H. White Co., 190 U.S. 260 (1900).
26. Bong v. Campbell Art Co., 214 U.S. 236 (1909).
27. Miffen v. R. H. White Co., 190 U.S. 260 (1900).
28. Tobani v. Carl Fischer, 98 F.2d 82 (6th Cir. 1928). This evidence may be gathercd
from the terms of the employment contract.
29. Anderson v. Baldwin Law Pub. Co., 27 F.2d 82 (6th Cir. 1928).
30. Henish v. Meier, 166 Ore. 482, 113 P.2d 438 (1941).
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writer if it is necessary to protect a threatened invasion of his
rights."
On the other hand where a photographer is engaged in the
usual course of business to take pictures for consideration, the
hirer is the owner of the negatives and photograph. From this it
follows that he is entitled to copyright as distinguished from the
photographer.3 2 However, where there is no consideration given
and it is at the photographer's expense, he becomes the owner of
the negative and photograph and is entitled to the copyright.~"
Architectural plans, drawings, and specifications are considered
the architect's and until publication he has exclusive right of use
for copyrighting purposes in his work product. 4
JOINT AUTHORS

Where two or more people act as joint authors of a preconceived
production a copyright may be secured in both their names" and
each has his undivided interest in the document. As in joint tenancy,
a copyright may also be secured by tenants in common."
CITIZENSHIP AND RESIDENCY AFFECTING THE RIGHT TO COPYRIGHT

17 U.S.C. § 8 provides that the copyright secured under the act
shall extend to the intellectual work of an author or proprietor, not
domiciled within the United States, who is a citizen or subject of a
foreign state or nation only when the foreign state or nation of
which such author or proprietor is a citizen or subject grants
similar rights to citizens of the United States, and that the existence
of the reciprocal document shall be determined by the President
of the United States, by proclamations made from time to time,
etc., is substantially the same as in the preceding statute.
Section eight (nine) of tb2 act goes on to provide that the copyright secured by this act is extended to the work of the author or
proprietor who is not a citizen or subject of a foreign state or
nation only when he is either (a) domiciled in the United States
at the time of first publication of his work, or (b) is a citizen or
subject of what is commonly called a "proclaimed country."
31. Folsom v. Marsh, Fed. Cases No. 4,901 (1841). ". . . No person has any right
to publish them without his consent, unless such publication be required to establish a
personal right or claim, or to vindicate character."
32. Avedon v. Exstein, 141 F.Supp. 278 (1956).
33. Lumiere v. Robertson Cole Distributing Corp., 280 Fed. 550, cert. denied, 259
U.S. 583 (1922).
34. Larkin v. Penn. R.R., 125 Misc. 238, 210 N.Y. Supp. 374 (192-5).
35. Shapiro, Bernstein Co. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 161 F.2d 406 (2nd Cir. 1955).
36. Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Wonnell, 61 F.Supp. 722 (D. 1945).
37. For countries which the United States has established copyright relations with see
17 U.S.C.A. § 9 (pocket part).
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The domicile may be acquired by (a) residence or (b) intention
to remain, which may be inferred in various circumstances as payment of taxes, establishment of a home or intention to become a
citizen. 8
It is to be noted that the status of the author is the determining
factor rather than that of the proprietor. Hence if the author is
not entitled to copyright, the proprietor can acquire no greater
right than the author himself possessed even though the proprietor
may be a citizen of this country. 9
It should be noted, that the proclamations of the President
regarding the existence of these reciprocal conditions does not
create the right of non-resident alien authors to benefit under the
copyright laws. It only extends the conditions under which these
privileges may be exercised. 40 Today, by proclamations, treaties
and conventions the United States has established copyright relations with most countries.
Each country should be carefully checked to fully appreciate
the extent the area in which these proclamations, treaties and
conventions apply. No two countries are identical, each compact
contains numerous qualifications which alter the particular act.
JOHN L. PLATrNER

JURISDICTIONAL CONFLICTS OF COMITY
IN FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS
The problem to be considered is that of jurisdictional conflict
between federal and state courts which could arise in the following manner: The defendant commits an act or acts that are in
violation of both federal and state laws. The federal government
gains physical custody of the defendant and he is tried, convicted
and placed on probation. The question then arises; can the state
prosecute the defendant for violation of state laws? Do both courts
or only one court have jurisdiction? When does the first court's
jurisdiction cease? These and related questions will be discussed
in the following article.
HISTORY

The authorities seem to be in conflict in the case of either the
state or federal court first acquiring jurisdiction over the defendant
and to whether they must grant the other right to prosecute. The
38. Ricordi v. Columbia Graphophone Co., 258 Fed. 72 (D. 1919).
39. Bong v. Campbell Art Co., 214 U.S. 236 (1919).
40. Chappel v. Fields, 210 Fed. 864 (2d Cir. 1914).

